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Abstract—The vast penetration of smart mobile devices pro-
vides a unique opportunity to make mobile social networking
pervasive by leveraging the feature of short-range wireless
communication technologies (e.g. WiFi Direct). In this paper, we
study local content dissemination in WiFi-Direct-based mobile
social networks (MSNs). We propose a simple GO-coordinated
dissemination strategy, as WiFi Direct does not originally support
content dissemination. Due to mobility and the short transmission
range, the duration of nodes in contact tends to be limited and
consequently they compete for the limited airtime to disseminate
their own data. Therefore, fair allocation of the limited airtime
among the nodes is required. We focus on fairness in content
dissemination rate, which is a key application-layer metric, rather
than fairness in throughput or airtime and formulate the allo-
cation problem as a generalized Nash bargaining game wherein
the nodes bargain for a share of the limited airtime. The game
is proved to have a unique optimal solution, and an algorithm
with low complexity is designed to find the optimal solution.
Furthermore, we propose a detailed scheduling approach to
implement the optimal solution. We also present numerical results
to evaluate the Nash bargaining based allocation and scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile social networks (MSNs) are new platforms that
enable people to share content and form groups without
Internet access. By exploiting short-distance wireless commu-
nication, people in MSNs can exchange information whenever
their devices are within each other’s transmission range. To
deal with intermittent connectivity due to mobility and short
communication range, MSNs employ a store-carry-forward
scheme to deliver data. It means that each mobile node may
carry different kinds of information for other nodes. Therefore,
nodes may need to exchange a large amount of data when they
come into each other’s range, especially when the MSN is used
for multimedia content dissemination and offloading.
WiFi Direct [1], which supports typical WiFi speeds and a
transmission range up to 200m, is a favorable technology for
data dissemination in MSNs. WiFi Direct devices connect to
each other by forming groups. In a group, one of the WiFi
Direct devices is selected as group owner (GO) to control
the group like a conventional access point (AP), while other
nodes connect to the GO as clients. Recently, researchers
have demonstrated the feasibility of using WiFi Direct as the
medium for opportunistic networking [2], multi-hop network-
ing [3], and multi-group networking [4] which are candidate
underlying networking techniques for MSNs. In addition, there
are already a few WiFi-Direct-based MSN applications that
feature content dissemination, such as CAMEO [5], public
safety [6], and social commerce service [7].
In the literature, there are a plethora of content dissemina-
tion protocols for MSNs [8], [9]. However, most of them do
not consider the specifics of underlying mobile networks in
their design and ignore problems such as channel allocation
and transmission scheduling. In this paper, we focus on local
content dissemination within a WiFi Direct group. By its
original design, WiFi Direct does not define client to client
communication. To allow the data of all nodes being shared
with others, we propose a GO-coordinated dissemination strat-
egy where the clients upload their data to the GO that later
broadcasts the received data for them.
Typically, the nodes in a WiFi Direct group cannot exchange
as much data as they want since the contact duration can be
highly limited due to their mobility. Therefore, a fair allocation
of the limited airtime among the nodes is required. The
problem of fair airtime allocation in traditional WiFi networks
(or WLANs) is a well-studied topic in the literature. Two
most studied fairness notions are throughput-based fairness
and time-based fairness [10], meaning contending nodes obtain
equal share of the throughput and airtime respectively1. In
local content dissemination, however, the meaning of through-
put or airtime is not direct to the nodes. Rather, content
dissemination rate is a more meaningful metric, as all nodes
want to disseminate their data to other nodes in a WiFi Direct
group as fast as possible. Therefore, we aim to achieve fairness
in content dissemination rate. In fact, equal throughput or
airtime does not result in equal dissemination rate. The reason
is that the GO has to forward data for the clients, and thus part
of its throughput or airtime will be used to disseminate other
nodes’ data. For the same reason, the node that is selected
to be the GO contributes more resources (e.g. battery power
and storage) than other nodes. Such asymmetric contributions
of nodes are not captured by allocation schemes that achieve
throughput-based fairness and time-based fairness.
In this work, we take advantage of a game-theoretic
approach, and model the airtime allocation problem as a
generalized Nash bargaining game, which yields a unique
solution that maximizes social welfare and guarantees fairness
1Throughput-based fairness and time-based fairness can be translated into
max-min fairness and proportional fairness, respectively [11], [12].
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in dissemination rate. In summery, we make the following
contributions: 1) we propose a GO-coordinated dissemination
strategy that enables content dissemination among nodes in
a WiFi Direct group; 2) considering the cooperative and self-
interested nature of the nodes, we model the airtime allocation
as a generalized Nash bargaining game, which captures the
asymmetric contributions of nodes, and prove the existence
of a unique optimal solution to the game; 3) we present an
algorithm with low complexity to find the optimal solution;
and 4) to implement the optimal allocation, we design a time-
slotted scheduling approach that divides the allocated time into
small slots and allows the nodes to transmit data in a round-
robin way.
The rest is organized as follows. Sec. II provides a brief
overview of WiFi Direct and introduces the GO-coordinated
dissemination. Sec. III presents an airtime allocation scheme
for the GO-coordinated dissemination using generalized Nash
bargaining. A detailed algorithm is designed in Sec. IV. In Sec.
V, numerical results are presented. Sec. VI discusses related
works. Finally, we conclude in Sec. VII.
II. CONTENT DISSEMINATION WITH WIFI DIRECT
A. WiFi Direct in Brief
WiFi Direct is built on the prominent WiFi infrastructure
mode [2]. It does not require dedicated hardware to support
its functionalities. Therefore, it is now natively included in
many mobile operating systems (e.g. Android 4.0 and above).
It enables devices to form groups for data exchange without
the need of an AP. The topology of a group can be one-to-
one or one-to-many. Within a group, a WiFi Direct device
is selected to act as group owner (GO) to control the group
including managing node join/leave, and starting/terminating
the group. The GO is actually a soft AP that provides some
functionalities of infrastructure AP, such as the basic service
set (BSS) functionality, and WiFi Protected Setup [1]. Other
devices in this group, called clients, connect to the GO like
connecting to an AP in a traditional WiFi network. To be the
GO, a device has to be WiFi Direct enabled, while the clients
can be WiFi Direct devices or normal WiFi devices.
The roles of GO and client are not permanent. WiFi Direct
specifies three modes of group formation, namely, standard,
autonomous, and persistent. In the standard mode, to form a
group, the devices need to negotiate and agree on the role
that each device will act in this group. Technically, after
these devices discover each other, they declare their desire to
become the GO by sending a GO Intent value to each other,
and the device declaring the highest value becomes the GO
[13]. The process in the autonomous mode is much simpler,
a device can autonomously create a group and select itself
as the GO, and other devices that discover this group can
join without negotiation. In the persistent mode, devices store
network credentials and group information including GO and
client roles for future usage.
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Fig. 1: An example of the GO-coordinated dissemination with a GO
and three clients (C1, C2, and C3). The data of C1 is first uploaded
to the GO and later broadcasted to other clients by the GO.
B. GO-Coordinated Dissemination
Content dissemination in MSNs exploits opportunistic con-
tacts between mobile nodes. WiFi Direct is a favorable com-
munication technology for such data dissemination due to its
long transmission range and high data rate, in comparison to
other alternatives such as Bluetooth and NFC2.
When a number of MSN nodes come into each other’s
transmission range, they first form a group by following one
of the group formation processes of WiFi Direct. Once the
group is established, the nodes can disseminate their data
to other nodes in the group. WiFi Direct does not define
the communication between clients [3], as each client does
not know the information of other clients including IDs,
MAC or IP addresses by its original design. Therefore, one
has to implement additional function along with the MSN
application to allow the data of all nodes being shared with
others. To avoid changing the MAC and network layer of WiFi
Direct, which may affect the operation of other WiFi Direct
based applications, it is preferred to implement the additional
function at the application layer.
Note that WiFi Direct is built on the WiFi infrastructure
mode, all traffic between clients has to go through the GO3.
Based on this feature, we propose a simple approach called
GO-coordinated dissemination. The basic idea is that, the
clients upload their data to the GO that later broadcasts the
received data for them (see Fig. 1 for an example). In addition,
the GO allocates exclusive slots to every node (including the
GO) and schedules all the data transmissions at the application
layer. This can be realized simply by the GO sending the
clients control messages to inform them to start/stop their
transmissions. The point for such centralized scheduling is
that WiFi Direct, like WiFi4, uses distributed coordination
function (DCF) to share the wireless channel among devices
in the same group, and therefore nodes that have data to
2WiFi Direct supports typical WiFi speeds (maximum 250Mb/s) and a
transmission range up to 200m, whilst Bluetooth and NFC only support data
rate up to 24Mb/s and 424kb/s, and transmission range up to 100m and
0.2m, respectively [14].
3MAC layer broadcast does not go through the GO, however, it is not
considered due to its unreliability [15].
4Point coordination function is another MAC technique used in IEEE
802.11, which allows AP to coordinate the communication within the network,
however it is not implemented by the Wi-Fi Alliance in its interoperability
standard [16].
transmit need to content for channel access, which can cause
severe collision and data retransmission when the data load
is heavy. By centralized scheduling at the application layer,
the GO-coordinated dissemination is able to alleviate channel
contention.
The Two-Node Case: When there are only two nodes in
a group, they can transmit data to each other directly using
unicast instead of the GO-coordinated dissemination. Once
new nodes join the group, the GO-coordinated dissemination
will be triggered. To this end, the GO checks the number of
nodes in the group whenever a node joins or leaves the group,
and selects proper transmission model accordingly.
III. FAIR AIRTIME ALLOCATION USING NASH
BARGAINING
In this section, we describe the fairness requirement in the
GO-coordinated dissemination, formulate the airtime alloca-
tion for the GO-coordinated dissemination as a generalized
Nash bargaining game, and analyze its solution that guarantees
fair airtime allocation among nodes in a WiFi Direct group.
A. Fairness Requirement in GO-Coordinated Dissemination
Consider a set I of nodes that have just formed a WiFi
Direct group, I = {1, 2, ..., I}. Each node i ∈ I has a set
of data, with total size Mi, to share with other nodes during
this contact. Since MSNs typically employ store-carry-forward
paradigm, the data to be shared can be readily determined by
the network-level dissemination protocol (e.g. SSAR [17] and
PrefCast [18]) upon forming a group. In MSNs, nodes contact
on the move, and therefore the contact duration can be so lim-
ited that some node(s) may not be able to finish disseminating
all data. A study shows that the average contact duration of
pedestrians with a mean speed of 1.3m/s is below 10 seconds
[19]. Though the GO-coordinated dissemination can alleviate
the contention among the nodes regarding channel access, the
nodes still have to compete for the limited airtime T which
is defined as the time available for data transmission during
a contact. Therefore, it is significant to allocate the limited
airtime to the nodes fairly.
Let Rb be the broadcast data rate and Rui be the uploading
data rate of i (Rui = 0 if i is the GO since the GO does not
upload data). Denote (y; x) = (y1, y2, ..., yI ;x1, x2, ..., xI) an
allocation of the limited airtime T , where yi is the allocated
time to upload i’s data (yi = 0 if i is the GO) and xi is
the allocated time to broadcast i’s data. In fact, we have yi =
Rb
Rui
·xi if we assume a stable loss rate during the whole contact.
Then any feasible allocation (y; x) is subject to the following
constraints:∑
i∈I
(1 + βi)xi = T, 0 ≤ xi ≤ bi,∀i ∈ I. (1)
where βi = R
b
Rui
(βi = 0 if i is the GO) and bi is the
estimated time required for the GO to broadcast all the data
of i. Assuming no retransmission, then bi = MiR .
Define content dissemination rate rk of a given node k
the amount of k’s data per unit time received by all other
nodes in the group. Then we have rk = R
b·xk
T . In this
paper, we aim for an allocation scheme that achieves fairness
in content dissemination rate. To design such a scheme, the
cooperative and self-interested behaviors of nodes have to be
taken into consideration. On one hand, each node in MSNs
benefits from the data dissemination, since it can receive data
of its interests and its own data can be further disseminated
by other nodes in the group in the future. On the other
hand, nodes are effectively autonomous agents, since there
is no network-wide control authority. Each node can decide,
on its own will, whether to join the group and contribute
resources to facilitate data dissemination. In addition, the node
selected as the GO contributes more resources than client
nodes. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that each node
seeks to maximize its utility from data dissemination over a
contact. Such cooperative and self-interested nature of nodes
makes this allocation problem perfectly fit into the analytical
framework of generalized Nash bargaining game. Since the
outcome of the bargaining game, which is called generalized
Nash bargaining solution (GNBS), ensures Pareto optimality
and achieves fairness in resource allocation, it is believed that
GNBS is a suitable allocation policy in the context of local
content dissemination in MSNs.
B. Airtime Allocation Based on GNBS
This section models the airtime allocation among nodes in
a WiFi Direct group as a Nash bargaining game. In this game,
players are the set I of nodes that are in contact and intend to
share data through WiFi Direct, and the resource they bargain
on is the limited airtime time T . Throughout bargaining, the
players either reach an agreement on an airtime allocation,
or come into disagreement. By the terminology of Nash
bargaining theory, a possible allocation of transmission time is
simply called a feasible agreement. Denote X ⊂ RI the set of
all possible agreements, x ∈ X , and d = (xd1, xd2, ..., xdI) the
disagreement event. For each player i ∈ I, there is a utility
function ui(ri) that represents the degree of satisfaction for
obtaining a dissemination rate of ri. ui(ri) is assumed to be a
differentiable, strict-increasing and concave function ∀i ∈ I,
meaning every node would like to obtain a high dissemination
rate. Since ri = R
b·xi
T , ui is a differentiable, strict-increasing
and concave function of xi as well. Each feasible agreement
in X results in a feasible utility vector u = (u1, u2, ..., uI) in
U ⊂ RI , the set of all feasible utility vectors.
Formally, the Nash bargaining game is defined by the
pair (U ,ud) where ud = (u1(xd1), u2(xd2), ..., uI(xdI)) is the
disagreement point. The interpretation is that if no agreement
is reached, then i gets utility ui(xdi ),∀i ∈ I. Throughout, we
assume that U is compact and convex, and there exists a u ∈ U
such that ui > ui(xdi ),∀i ∈ I which ensures that there exists
a mutually beneficial agreement [20].
Mathematically, GNBS, the optimal outcome of the gener-
alized bargaining game, maximizes the following generalized
Nash product (i.e. social welfare)
max
x
∏
i∈I
(ui(xi)− ui(xdi ))αi , s.t.

∑
i∈I
(1 + βi)xi = T
0 ≤ xi ≤ bi,∀i ∈ I.
(2)
where αi represents the bargaining power of player i, and∑I
i=1 αi = 1. The player with larger bargaining power could
obtain higher dissemination rate and utility. In the content dis-
semination, the GO is entitled to obtain a larger dissemination
rate and utility, as it contributes more resources (e.g. battery
power) than clients. Therefore, we assign larger bargaining
power to the GO than to the clients. Since the function of
log is concave and monotonic, the above generalized Nash
bargaining problem is equivalent to (see proof in [21])
max
x
I∑
i=1
αi log(ui(xi)− ui(xdi )), s.t.
{∑
i∈I(1 + βi)xi = T
0 ≤ xi ≤ bi,∀i ∈ I.
(3)
Let Li(xi) = 1+βiαi ·
ui(xi)−ui(xdi )
u′i(xi)
, Fi( 1λ ) =
∑I
n=i(1 + βn) ·
L−1n (
1
λ ), i = 1, 2, ..., I . Without loss of generality, we assume
the players are indexed such that L1(b1) < L2(b2) < · · · <
LI(bI). Then, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. There exists a unique agreement x? =
(x?1, x
?
2, ..., x
?
I) that induces the GNBS, which can be found
by the following algorithm
x?i = min
{
bi;L
−1
i
(
F−1i
(
T −
i−1∑
j=1
(1 + βj)x
?
j
))}
,
i = 1, 2, ..., I.
(4)
It is easy to find that the above algorithm has a computa-
tional complexity of O(I) where I is the number of nodes in
the group. Since the constraints are linear, the objective func-
tion of problem (3) is a sum of concave functions, and hence
concave, we are able to prove Theorem 1 with Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [22]. The complete proof is given
in the Appendix. With x?, the optimal allocation of broadcast
time found by (4), the optimal allocation for uploading can be
readily given by y? = (β1x?1, β2x
?
2, ..., βIx
?
I).
Allocation for The Two-Node Case: Content dissemination
for the two-node case does not need data uploading from the
client to the GO. Letting I = {1, 2} and β1, β2 = 0, the
airtime allocation for the two-node case can also be modeled
by the GNBS (2). In addition, the optimal allocation for the
two-node case can be found by (4) as well.
IV. GNBS-BASED SCHEDULING APPROACH TO ACHIEVE
FAIR ALLOCATION
In this section, we present a GNBS-based scheduling ap-
proach (GSA) to achieve the fair allocation. The goal of
GSA is three-fold: 1) to select a suitable GO that can make
better use of the limited airtime; 2) to determine the allocation
interval, namely, the length of airtime to be allocated; and 3)
to schedule the transmissions (i.e. uploading and broadcast) of
GSA
Contact table updating
Role selection
Time-slotted scheduling
Airtime allocation
WiFi Direct API
Network 
protocol
Fig. 2: Components of GSA.
all the nodes. Fig. 2 shows the structure and components of
GSA.
A. Role Selection
When several nodes come into contact, they first discover
each other with the discovery service defined by WiFi Direct.
After the discovery phase, each node summarizes how much
data it wants to share, which is determined by the used routing
protocol, and estimates how long it will stay in contact with
other nodes. Then it sends a message containing information
of its data load and the estimated contact duration to the others.
Afterwards, they have to negotiate the roles of GO and client.
We assume that the nodes are capable of estimating a
pairwise contact duration (PCD) with any other node, based
either on their contact history or movements. For this, it
has been shown by literature studies on contact traces that
the pairwise contact duration of nodes in MSN-like networks
follows certain distributions (e.g., power-law [23], log-normal
[19]), and the nodes can use the mean value of the contact
duration as the estimated contact duration. Alternatively, the
nodes can compute an estimated contact duration with their
mobility characteristics such as velocity and moving distance
[24]. Denote dji the estimated PCD between node i and j. We
assume dji = d
i
j for any pair of nodes. Upon joining the group,
each node creates a contact table that records the ID, PCD and
total data size of all the nodes in contact. The table will be
updated whenever a node leaves or a new node joins the group,
and it will be deleted when the node itself leaves the group.
Detailed contact table updating is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Contact table updating (executed by each i)
1: initialize:
create a contact table upon joining a group
2: while new node k joins do
3: add < ID,PCD,M >k
4: I ← I ∪ {k}
5: end while
6: while node k leaves do
7: remove < ID,PCD,M >k
8: I ← I/{k}
9: end while
10: while it leaves do
11: delete the contact table
12: end while
AB
C
D
GO
Node ID Load(ms)
A 10
B 20
C 30
D 40
Fig. 3: An illustration of GO selection, where the solid lines are real
connections after the group is formed. A and C are two candidates
for the GO, since they both have direct connection with other nodes.
Assume the data rate is 10mb/s. Then, it needs (10+2×(20+30+
40))/10 = 19s for all the nodes finish broadcasting their data if A
is the GO, while it needs only (30+ 2× (10+ 20+ 40))/10 = 17s
if C is the GO. Clearly, C is more suitable to be the GO.
To be the GO, one node has to be able to build direct
connections with all other nodes, so that every client is
reachable via the GO. If there are multiple such nodes5, then
the one with the largest data load will be selected as the GO.
In Fig. 3, both node A and C can build direct connection
with other nodes. Since having larger load than A, C will be
selected as the GO. The above role selection scheme can be
summarized as Algorithm 2. It will be executed immediately
after the contact table is updated.
Algorithm 2 Role selection (executed by each node i)
1: while the contact table is updated do
2: if i ∈ I ′ then . I ′ is set of nodes that are able to
build direct connections with all other nodes.
3: if i = arg maxk{Mk,∀k ∈ I ′} then
4: set role = GO
5: else
6: set role = Client
7: end if
8: else
9: set role = Client
10: end if
11: end while
B. Allocation Interval
Normally, nodes in a group join or leave at different times
due to their mobility. And any group change (e.g. node join and
leave) necessarily triggers a new allocation among remaining
group members. That basically means there would be many
rounds of allocation during the lifetime of a group. Therefore,
it is important to find the allocation interval T , the time for
each round of allocation. We let T = mink dkGO, the shortest
PCD between the GO and other nodes. If a larger interval is
used, the node i = arg mink dkGO will not receive data from
some other nodes and vice versa, since it is supposed to leave
the group at mink dkGO.
5If there is no such node, they can form multiple groups and negotiate for
a dedicated channel for each group. However, that is out of our scope.
rT
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Fig. 4: Unfairness to node B caused by estimation error of contact
duration. In the figure, Tr is real contact duration, while Te is the
estimated contact duration which is used for allocation.
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Fig. 5: Time-slotted scheduling among three nodes for the GO-
coordinated dissemination where node 1 is the GO.
C. Time-Slotted Scheduling
The allocation by GNBS relies on an estimation of the
contact duration. The estimation error of contact duration
would compromise the optimality of the allocation in terms
of fairness (See Fig. 4 for an example). In order to reduce
the unfairness caused by the estimation error, the allocated
time by GNBS will be broken into small transmission slots.
In addition, during each allocation interval, the transmission
of all the nodes in I is scheduled in a round-robin way.
The slot for a given node i is composed of two sub-slots, i.e.,
an uploading slot and a broadcast slot. During the uploading
slot, node i sends its data to the GO, while during the broadcast
slot, the GO broadcasts the received data from i to the other
nodes. The whole slot size is given by
Wi =
(1 + βi)x
?
i
mink{(1 + βk)x?k}
· tslot (5)
where tslot, an engineering parameter, denotes the basic slot
size. Then, the sizes of the uploading slot and the broadcast
slot can be immediately obtained, which are
Wui = βi ·Wi/(1 + βi) and W bi = Wi/(1 + βi), (6)
respectively.
An example of the time-slotted scheduling is illustrated in
Fig. 5. The time-slotted scheduling is executed by the GO.
To create a schedule, the GO needs the client to send their
individual information to it, as specified in Algorithm 3. After
the calculation, a schedule will be sent to each client. Finally,
all the nodes transmit their data by following the schedule.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, we consider a basic system setup and
evaluate the performance of GSA through numerical study. We
assume the loss probability is uniformly distributed in [0, 0.1].
Low loss is assumed due to little contention on channel access
among nodes in the group. The estimation error of contact
Algorithm 3 Time-slotted scheduling (executed by the GO)
Require: T and (ui, xdi , bi, βi) from each client
1: while all information received do
2: calculate (y?,x?) using Eq. (4)
3: calculate Wu = (Wu1 ,Wu2 , ...,WuI ) and Wb =
(W b1 ,W
b
2 , ...,W
b
I ) using Eq. (5) and (6)
4: send Wu, Wb and tstart to each client
5: end while
TABLE I: Allocated uploading/broadcast time yi/xi (s).
Node i GSA EQL WTD
yi xi yi xi yi xi
n1 0.714 0.714 0.909 0.909 0.217 0.217
n2 0.714 0.714 0.909 0.909 0.435 0.435
n3 0.714 0.714 0.909 0.909 0.869 0.869
n4 0 2.857 0 0.909 0 0.869
n5 0.714 0.714 0.909 0.909 1.304 1.304
n6 0.714 0.714 0.909 0.909 1.739 1.739
duration follows a normal distribution N(0, 1). Uploading rate
and broadcast rate are both set to 11mb/s. Default basic slot
size tslot is set to 20ms. For the utility function, we use the
following normalized form:
ui =
ri
rmaxi
=
Rb·xi
T
Rb·bi
T
=
xi
bi
(7)
where ui ∈ [0, 1]. We assign the same bargaining power αc
to all clients, and a bargaining power αg = 2αc to the GO.
Lastly, the disagreement point ud is set to 0 without loss of
generality. In our future work, we will study different forms of
utility function and disagreement point under a more general
system setup.
A. Fairness in Airtime Allocation
We consider a WiFi Direct group I comprising 6
nodes, I = {n1, n2, n3, n4, n5, n6}. Their data loads are
[10, 20, 40, 40, 60, 80] (in mb). The following two schemes are
used to compare with our GSA:
• Equal allocation (EQL). The broadcast slot sizes of all
nodes are equal.
• Weighted allocation (WTD). The broadcast slot sizes of
all nodes are proportional to their requirements.
Table I shows the allocation results of GSA, EQL and WTD
for an instance with allocation interval T = 10s and n4 acting
as the GO. As the GO, n4 does not need to spend time on
uploading. GSA allocates equal broadcast time to all client
nodes while allocates a notably larger amount of time to the
GO (i.e. n4). Fig. 6 illustrates the resulting dissemination
rates of the nodes. It can be seen that clients obtain equal
dissemination rate, while the GO gets a much larger rate due
to its larger bargaining power. It indicates that GSA provides
fairness in dissemination rate while capturing the asymmetric
contributions of nodes.
It is easy to show that GNBS guarantees weighted propor-
tional fairness in utility [25] when ud = 0. It means that
moving away from the GNBS point uGNBS to another point
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Fig. 6: Comparison of GSA, EQL and WTD when T = 10s .
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Contact duration (s)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
G
en
er
al
ize
d 
Na
sh
 p
ro
du
ct
EQL
WTD
GSA
Fig. 7: Generalized Nash products of GSA, EQL and WTD over
different contact durations.
u¯ ∈ U will not increase the aggregate of weighted proportional
changes in utilities:
I∑
i=1
αi · u¯i − u
GNBS
i
uGNBSi
≤ 0. (8)
Fig. 7 shows a comparison between GSA, EQL and WTD in
terms of weighted proportional fairness. Each point represents
an average of 1000 runs, reflecting the randomness of the
contact duration. As expected, GSA always has larger gen-
eralized Nash product than EQL and WTD. Fig. 8 illustrates
that the average generalized Nash product for a specific mean
contact duration, i.e., 20s, versus the number of contacts of
this group of nodes who are likely to meet with each other
continually over time. The average generalized Nash product
for the first few contacts fluctuates, due to impact of the
estimation error. However, it does not take too many times of
contact to converge to the theoretical maximum generalized
Nash product.
The GNBS based airtime allocation used by GSA relies
on a contact duration estimation. In practice, the estimation
may hardly achieve perfect accuracy. As a result, the weighted
proportional fairness of GSA could be compromised. Fig. 9
illustrates the aggregate of weighted proportional changes over
different basic slot sizes. As can be seen, the aggregate is
slightly below zero, and decreases almost linearly with the
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Fig. 8: Average generalized Nash product over time. The circle at the
end of each curve denotes the maximum generalized Nash product
without randomness.
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Fig. 9: Achieved weighted proportional fairness by the time-slotted
scheduling of GSA with different basic slot sizes.
basic slot size. To achieve better fairness, small basic slot size
is preferred.
B. Dynamic Join/Leave of Nodes
In this simulation, we show the adaptivity of GSA to
dynamic join/leave of nodes into the group. Consider four
nodes {n1, n2, n3, n4} that join the group at [0, 0, 4, 12]s and
leave the group at [8, 16, 20, 20]s. They have [25, 20, 15, 10]mb
data for each of the rest nodes. Since each node join or leave
triggers a new round of allocation, there will be five rounds of
allocation, and the allocation intervals are all 4 seconds. The
basic slot size is set to 100ms. Fig. 10 shows the schedule for
the four nodes. It can be seen that when there are three nodes
in the group (i.e., during (4, 8]s and (12, 16]s), the GO relays
data for the clients. Each client uploads its data to the GO
during its uploading slots, followed by the GO broadcasting
the data to other clients. GSA rewards the GO with much
higher broadcast slot size than the clients, as can be noted in
Table II.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Contact Duration in MSNs
In MSNs, contact duration is normally short due to the
mobility and short transmission range of nodes. As a result,
the capacity of a contact is limited. There are a number of
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Fig. 10: The schedule for {n1, n2, n3, n4} during (0, 20]s.
TABLE II: Uploading/broadcast slot sizes Wu/Wb (ms).
Node (0− 4]s (4− 8]s (8− 12]s (12− 16]s (16− 20]s
Wu Wb Wu Wb Wu Wb Wu Wb Wu Wb
n1 167 400
n2 100 100 100 133 400
n3 100 100 100 100 100 150
n4 100 100 100
recent works considering the significance of limited contact
duration in their protocol design [24], [26]–[32], though it
tends to be overlooked by earlier works on routing, forwarding
in MSNs. LCD [30] improves the shortest-path routing by
diverting some message(s) to other nodes not on the shortest
path if a node is on the shortest paths of too many messages.
Large content normally needs long duration to propagate.
Given that the contact duration follows an exponential law
distribution, Y. Li et al. show that content size is one of the
most important factors to influence the content dissemination
delay [29]. Assuming that data of large size could not be
completely transmitted during a single contact, authors pro-
pose fragmentation-based schemes for data replication [26],
cooperative caching [27], traffic offloading [28], and message
forwarding [24], respectively. These schemes generally divide
each data piece into a number of small packets or blocks at
the source node with techniques such as network coding, and
send a subset of them to each node that comes into contact.
The above works assume that nodes contact with each other
in a pairwise manner, which has been a predominant assump-
tion in most MSN literature. However, in [33], simultaneous
multiple contact among nodes is found to be quite common
in real-world contact traces. Therefore, group communication
can be more efficient than pairwise communication for content
dissemination if multiple nodes are in contact at the same
time. In this paper, we follow up this idea and propose GO-
coordinated dissemination for MSN content dissemination.
More differently from the above works, we study the contact
duration from a resource allocation’s perspective.
B. Application of Nash Bargaining
Nash bargaining solution has been extensively used to
model resource allocation problems in computer networks,
such as bandwidth allocation [21] and Internet access sharing
[34]. As an extension of NBS, generalized Nash bargaining
solution, also called asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, is
able to capture the differences among players in bargaining
power. H. Boche et al. use GNBS to study resource allocation
among users with different priorities in wireless networks
[35]. In [36], [37], the authors apply GNBS to the problem
of rate allocation among multimedia users with a distortion-
based utility function. To provide fairness, different bargain-
ing powers are assigned to users with heterogeneous video
characteristics. Based on a GNBS modeling, Falloc algorithm
provides minimum bandwidth guarantee while allocates resid-
ual bandwidth fairly among all virtual machine pairs in a data
center [38]. In this paper, we use GNBS to model the airtime
allocation problem among a group of mobile nodes in WiFi-
Direct-based MSNs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied local content dissemination in
a WiFi-Direct-based MSN. Specifically, we proposed an in-
tuitive GO-coordinated dissemination strategy that does not
require change on the WiFi Direct protocol. We designed a
Nash bargaining based fair airtime allocation to decide how
long each node can use to transmit data during the limited
contact duration. Since the optimal allocation given by the
bargaining model cannot be directly implemented due to that
the estimation of the contact duration may be inaccurate, we
designed a time-slotted scheduling approach that divides the
allocated time into smaller slots and allows nodes to transmit
in a slot at a time. Finally, we validated the designed allocation
scheme and scheduling approach through numerical study.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work was partly supported by the EU FP7 CLIMBER
project (www.fp7-climber.eu).
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof consists of two steps: 1) we prove that there is a
unique agreement x? induces the GNBS by using Lemma 1
- 3; and 2) we prove that the unique agreement can be found
by (4) with Lemma 4.
Lemma 1. Node i will not consider alternatives in [0, xdi ], for
any i ∈ I.
Proof: Equivalently, this lemma states that, if x? ex-
ists, then x?i > x
d
i . Suppose x
?
i ≤ xdi . Since ui(xi)
is a strict-increasing function, it is easy to see that
ui(x
?
i ) ≤ ui(xdi ) holds and the objective function P (x) =
maxx
∑I
i=1 log(ui(xi) − ui(xdi )) in (3) is increasing in x.
Since it has been assumed that there exists a mutually ben-
eficial agreement, we have ∃ui(x˜i) > ui(xdi ) ≥ ui(x?i ) for
every i. As a result, P (x˜) > P (x?). It apparently contradicts
the fact that x? maximizes P (x). Therefore, player i will not
consider alternatives in [0, xdi ], ∀i ∈ I.
Lemma 1 helps us reduce the constraint of 0 ≤ xi ≤ bi to
xdi < xi ≤ bi. Consequently, the optimization problem (3) is
equivalent to
max
x
I∑
i=1
αi log(ui(xi)− ui(xdi )), s.t.
{∑
i∈I(1 + βi)xi = T
xdi < xi ≤ bi,∀i ∈ I.
(9)
Since the constraints are linear, the objective function of
problem (9) is a sum of concave functions, and hence concave,
we can find the unique optimal solution with KKT conditions
[22]. The Lagrangian is
` =
I∑
i=1
αi log(ui(xi)− ui(xdi ))− λ(
I∑
i=1
(1 + βi)xi − T )
−
I∑
i=1
µi(x
d
i − xi)−
I∑
i=1
νi(xi − bi) (10)
where λ ≥ 0, µi ≥ 0 and νi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I are Lagrangian
multipliers. The optimality conditions are given by
αiu
′
i(xi)
ui(xi)− ui(xdi )
− λ(1 + βi) + µi − νi = 0
I∑
i=1
(1 + βi)xi − T = 0
µi(x
d
i − xi) = 0
νi(xi − bi) = 0 ∀i ∈ I.
Lemma 2. Let Li(xi) = 1+βiαi ·
ui(xi)−ui(xdi )
u′i(xi)
. Li(xi) is an
increasing function on (xdi , bi].
Proof: For each node i, the utility function ui(xi) is a dif-
ferentiable, strict-increasing and concave function. It implies
that u′i(xi) > 0 and u
′′
i (xi) < 0 where u
′
i(xi) and u
′′
i (xi) are
the first and the second derivatives of ui(xi) with respect to xi,
respectively. By u′′i (xi) < 0, we know that u
′
i(xi) decreases
with xi. Given any x1i , x
2
i ∈ (xdi , bi], if x1i > x2i , then
ui(x
1
i ) > ui(x
2
i ) > ui(x
d
i ) and u
′
i(x
2
i ) > u
′
i(x
1
i ). Then, it is
easy to see that 1+βiαi ·
ui(x
1
i )−ui(xdi )
u′i(x
1
i )
> 1+βiαi ·
ui(x
2
i )−ui(xdi )
u′i(x
2
i )
> 0.
Hence, Li(xi) strictly increases with xi ∈ (xdi , bi]. Moreover,
L−1i (·) is a strict-increasing function on (Li(xdi ), Li(bi)].
Now we start to solve these equations, to find x, λ, µ, and
ν. First of all, it can be easily seen that µi = 0 for all i ∈ I,
since xdi < xi. Note that νi acts as a slack variable in the last
equation, so it can be eliminated, leaving
λ ≤ 1
Li(xi)
(11)
I∑
i=1
(1 + βi)xi − T = 0 (12)
(
1
Li(xi)
− λ)(xi − bi) = 0 ∀i ∈ I. (13)
By Lemma 2, we know that 1Li(xi) strictly decreases with xi
on (xdi , bi]. Therefore, 1) if λ
? > 1Li(bi) , (11) holds only if
xi < bi. It implies that λ? = 1Li(xi) , by (13). Then we have
x?i = L
−1
i (
1
λ? ) if λ
? > 1Li(bi) ; 2) if λ
? < 1Li(bi) , which with
1
Li(bi)
≤ 1Li(xi) implies λ? < 1Li(xi) , we get x?i = bi, by (13);
and 3) if λ? = 1Li(bi) , (13) becomes (
1
Li(xi)
− 1Li(bi) )(xi −
bi) = 0, which has a unique solution x?i = bi = L
−1
i (
1
λ? ). In
)
1
(
λ
G
T

1 )( jj bL)( 11 j-j- bL
λ
1
the j-th piece
Fig. 11: G( 1
λ
). The gradient at 1
λ
on each piece j (not including its
start and end points) is given by
d(
∑I
n=j(1+βn)L
−1
n (
1
λ
))
d( 1
λ
)
.
conclusion, we have
x?i =
{
L−1i (
1
λ? ), if
1
λ? ≤ Li(bi)
bi, if 1λ? > Li(bi), ∀i ∈ I.
(14)
More simply,
x?i = min{bi;L−1i (
1
λ?
)},∀i ∈ I. (15)
Substituting (15) into the condition
∑I
i=1(1 + βi)xi−T = 0,
we obtain
I∑
i=1
(1 + βi) ·min{bi;L−1i (
1
λ?
)} = T. (16)
Without loss of generality, we assume the players are
indexed such that L1(b1) < L2(b2) < · · · < LI(bI).
Lemma 3. Let G( 1λ ) =
∑I
i=1(1 + βi) · min{bi;L−1i ( 1λ )}.
Then G( 1λ ) is a strict-increasing function on (0, LI(bI)].
Proof: As depicted in Fig. 11, G is a piecewise function
of 1λ , with breakpoints at Li(bi), i = 1, 2, ..., I . For the jth
piece defined on (Lj−1(bj−1), Lj(bj)], Gj( 1λ ) =
∑j−1
m=1(1 +
βm)bm + Fj(
1
λ ) where Fi(
1
λ ) =
∑I
n=i(1 + βn) · L−1n ( 1λ ),
j = 1, 2, ..., I . In the proof of Lemma 2, we have shown
that L−1j (·) is a strict-increasing function on (0, Lj(bj)],
j = 1, 2, ..., I . Evidently, Fj( 1λ ) and Gj(
1
λ ) strictly increases
with 1λ . Hence, G(
1
λ ) in overall strictly increases with
1
λ on
(0, LI(bI)].
It is easy to verify that 0 < 1λ? < LI(bI). Otherwise, we get∑I
i=1 x
?
i = 0 if
1
λ? = 0, and
∑I
i=1(1 + βi)x
?
i =
∑I
i=1(1 +
βi)bi > T if 1λ? ≥ LI(bI), which contradict
∑
i(1 + βi)x
?
i =
T . Since G( 1λ ) =
∑I
i=1(1 + βi) min{bi;L−1i ( 1λ )} strictly in-
creases with 1λ on (0, LI(bI)], stated in Lemma 3, there is only
one 1λ? that results in
∑I
i=1(1 + βi) min{bi;L−1i ( 1λ? )} = T ,
namely, (16). With unique 1λ? , we can argue that x
?
i in (15)
is unique as well.
The above proves that there is a unique solution to the
bargaining game. In the following, we prove that the unique
solution can be given by (4). To avoid confusion, denote
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, ..., x¯I) the agreement found by (4). It has been
proved that there is a unique agreement x? = (x?1, x
?
2, ..., x
?
I)
that satisfies (15). Therefore, to prove that (4) can find the
unique agreement, we can show that x¯i = x?i , namely,
min
{
bi;L
−1
i
(
F−1i
(
T −∑i−1j=1(1 + βj)x?j))} = min{bi;L−1i ( 1λ? )}
for every i = 1, 2, ..., I . First of all, let us introduce the
following lemma.
Lemma 4. If x¯j = x?j for j = 1, ..., i− 1, then x¯i = x?i .
Proof: Let 1λi = F
−1
i (T −
∑i−1
j=1(1 + βj)x¯j). Then we
have x¯i = min{bi;L−1i ( 1λi )}. In the following, we show that
x¯i = x
?
i for the cases of
1
λ? ≥ Li(bi) and 1λ? < Li(bi).
1) If 1λ? ≥ Li(bi), we can prove that 1λi ≥ Li(bi) by
contradiction. Assume to the contrary that 1λi < Li(bi). Since
L−1j (·) is an increasing function for every j, we have
bi = L
−1
i (Li(bi)) > L
−1
i (
1
λi
), (17)
and
L−1k (
1
λ?
) > L−1k (
1
λi
), k = i+ 1, ..., I. (18)
Further, since Li(bi) < Lk(bk), we have
bk = L
−1
k (Lk(bk)) > L
−1
k (Li(bi)) > L
−1
k (
1
λi
). (19)
From (18) and (19), it can be seen that
min{bk;L−1k (
1
λ?
)} > L−1k (
1
λi
), k = i+ 1, ..., I. (20)
With 1λ? ≥ Li(bi), from (15) we know that x?i = bi. Then, by
(16), we have
T =
i−1∑
j=1
(1 + βj)x
?
j + (1 + βi)bi+
I∑
k=i+1
(1 + βk) min{bk;L−1k (
1
λ?
)}.
(21)
Using the assumption that x¯j = x?j for j = 1, ..., i − 1, and
the inequalities in (17) and (20) gives
T >
i−1∑
j=1
(1 + βj)x¯j + (1 + βi)L
−1
i (
1
λi
) +
I∑
k=i+1
(1 + βk)L
−1
k (
1
λi
)
=
i−1∑
j=1
(1 + βj)x¯j + Fi(
1
λi
). (22)
Because 1λi = F
−1
i (T −
∑i−1
j=1(1 + βj)x¯j), the right side
of (22) equals T . Now we have a contradiction. Therefore,
1
λi
≥ Li(bi) holds. As a result, x¯i = bi = x?i .
2) If 1λ? < Li(bi), we prove that
1
λi
= 1λ? . By
1
λ? < Li(bi),
we have x?k = L
−1
k (
1
λ? ), for k = i, ..., I . Then it follows from
(16) that T =
∑i−1
j=1(1 + βj)x
?
j +
∑I
k=i(1 + βk)L
−1
k (
1
λ? ).
Equivalently,
I∑
k=i
(1 + βk)L
−1
k (
1
λ?
) = T −
i−1∑
j=1
(1 + βj)x
?
j . (23)
The left part of (23) is effectively Fi( 1λ? ), while the right part
equals Fi( 1λi ) because T −
∑i−1
j=1(1+βj)x
?
j = T −
∑i−1
j=1(1+
βj)x¯j = Fi(
1
λi
) under the assumption that x¯j = x?j for j =
1, ..., i − 1. In other words, Fi( 1λ? ) = Fi( 1λi )which implies
1
λi
= 1λ? . Consequently, x¯i = x
?
i . This completes the proof of
the lemma.
It remains to show that x¯1 = x?1. In fact, it can be easily
proved by letting i = 1 and following exactly the same steps
with the proof of Lemma 4. With x¯1 = x?1, we can get that
x¯i = x
?
i , i = 2, 3, ..., I by iteratively applying Lemma 4.
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